must still be empirical, trial and error therapy. We are compelled by our limitations to resort to shoring things up, applying halfway technology, trying to fix things after the fact.'
T h e judicial debate continues to rage over the right of a child born sufferingfrom genetic impairments to recover on his own behalf against a physician or laboratory which failed to give his parents correct information about the defect. These "wrongful life" suits are brought by parents on behalf of their child, who in most cases is born suffering from mental or physical defects which could have been detected by genetic screening. In contrast, "wrongful birth" suits are actions brought by parents of a child born as the result of a defendant's negligence, seeking damages for either the costs incident to the unwanted pregnancy and birth of a normal child, or the costs related to the unexpected birth and care of an impaired child. The two actions are distinguished by who may bring them-the parents or thechild.' Wrongful life suits continue to be disallowed by the courts, while those same courts allow wrongful birth suits by the parents to collect for the expenses of raising the imMr. Furrow themselves forced into "an evaluation not only of law, but also of morals, medicine and society,"' but seem unable to break free from self-imposed logical barriers and the "semantic quicksand"6 which block insight into the issues. I propose toconsider the arguments against the diminished life suits, as most recently raised in three cases decided within the last year in California and Pennsylvania, to sort out the real from the spurious issues, and to offer a more reasonable way of viewing such suits in light of the functions of tort litigation. An important first step in clarifying the issues is to replace the term "wrongful life" in order to reduce the semantic overload of a phrase that tends to "confuse and conf o~n d . "~ The phrase "diminished life" may help to liberate our thinking in this difficult and troubling area.
"Diminished 1ife"suits are precipitated by a range of medical failures in assessing data and conveying information to potential parents. In all threecases, the result is a serious impairment of the newborn child. The negligence in all cases involves a similar failure to test properly for defects.
Why should we allow both the parents and the child to sue in cases 1 and 2, but only the parents in case 3! The critical difference seems to lie in the natureof the treatment and its causal relationship to the harm. In Case 1, sustained exposure to light will correct the condition and the child will be normal, and in case 2, vitamin therapy will solve the problem. In case 3, however, no treatment in utero or after birth can correct the condition. Abortion is the only means the parents have for dealing with the psychic and monetary costs that an impaired infant will present. Notwithstanding that ahortion is a morally and politically sensitive subject, is the difference between treatment and an informed choice as to termination great enough to justify recovery in cases 1 and 2 but not in 3?
In all three cases, the children are comparably impaired, the parents subjected to comparable expenses and pain and suffering, and the negligence of the medical personnel equally culpable. The condition of the third child cannot be described as qualitatively different, nor is the negligence in case 3 less objectionable than in cases 1 or 2.
The primary difference is that in cases 1 and 2, the physician failed to diagnose and treat, thereby causing the impairment, whereas in case 3 the physician did not, by failing to treat, cause the Mongolism. By failing to diagnose, however, he denied the parents their option to "treat" by aborting the child." We need to take a hard look at the courts' justifications for distinguishing these situations, to test whether they withstand tests of logic, fairness, and consistency with tort principles.
The Judicial Debate
Three recent decisions, Speck u. Finegold from Pennsylvania,I6 and the California appellate and Supreme Court decisions in Turpin v. Sortini," present in sharp focus the continuing judicial struggle with the "diminished life" claims. The cases highlight the tensions which such claims present, and reveal judicial movement in two major jurisdictions toward full recognition of the claims of an impaired child. The California Court of Appeals for the Fifth District, in Turpin, rejected a claim by the infant plaintiff and explicitly rejected the holding and reasoning of its sister court which a year earlier had allowed such an action in Curhder v. BioScience Labratoria.
The supreme court, faced with the lower court conflict in Turpin and Curlender, recentlv considered the "diminished 1ife"claims raised in these cases.I9 It allowed the infant plaintiff to bringa suit o n her behalf, while simultaneously restricting damages available in the evenrofafindingof!iability. Turpin involved a plaintiff, Joy, born with a hereditary total deafness abnormality. The complaint alleged that the defendant physicians were negligent for failing to diagnose the defect in the plaintiffs older sister Hope and in advising the parents that Hope's hearing was within normal limits, when in fact a careful examination would have revealed that she was totally deaf. In reliance on the defendant's diagnosis of Hope, Joy was conceived.Thecomplaint alleged that as a result of defendant's negligence, Joy was "deprived of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being without total deafness, all to her general damages.'l20
In Turpin, the California Supreme Court allowed the infant plaintiff to sue on her own behalf for the costs of special care, training, and other special costs that may arise. The court, however, denied recovery for general damages, pain and suffering, and emotional distress.
The Court of Appeals rejected the "di- Court, in a 4-2 opinion, allowed the infant plaintiff Joy to sue on her own behalf for the costs of special care, training, and other special costs that might arise. The court denied potential recovery, however, for general damages (those which cannot be specifically established by medical testimony or tangible proofs), pain and suffering, and emotional distress, in a curious opinion which allowed the cause of action while at the same time accepting many of the arguments made by other courts against the allowance of "diminished life" claims." Speck v. Finegold involved an infant suffering from neurofibromatosis. The father suffered from the disease, their previous twochildren inherited it, and the parents decided not to have more children. The father underwent a vasectomy and was told that he was sterile; nonetheless his wife subsequently became pregnant. She then sought an abortion. which another defendant failed to perform properly and she gave birth four months later to Francine, who had neurofibromatosis. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the parents had a claim against the defendant physicians to recover expenses attributable to the birth and raising of the child, and for mental distress and physical inconvenience related to the birth. The court split evenly o n the child's "diminished life" claim, however, and the lower court's denial of the cause of action therefore was affirmed.
The opinions in Turpin,, Turpin,, and Speck raise three areas of dispute with regard t o "diminished life" suits:
(1) the problemofcalculatingdamages; ( 2 ) the logical dilemma of allowing a party to sue when, absent the asserted negligence, the plaintiff would The remedy afforded an injured party in negligence is intended to place the injured party in the position he would have occupied hut for the negligence of the defendant. Thus, acause of action hrought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery for a "wrongful life" o n grounds she should not have been born demands a calcu- In Turpin,, the majority of the California Supreme Court was troubled, as was the lower court in Turpin ,, by the problem of comparing life to nonlife and assessing damages. Justice Kaus, wriring for the majority, rejected general damages because of a perception that judges and juries would find it "simply impossible" to decide if any impaired life is better than no life at aLZ9 Thus, a notion of logical impossibility continues to haunt the discussion in the recent cases, even when, as in Turpin,, the court opens the door to the cause of action. The reasoning of Turpin, (and by implication of Gleitman and of the lower court opinion in Speck) does not withstand analysis. First, the argument from first principles ofdamage remedies is incorrect, taking far too narrow a view of the function ofdamages in tort law. Damages represent a crude means by which courts value an injury in dollar terms, requiring that a defendant pay a plaintiff "to make up for some loss that was not, originally, a money loss, but one that ordinarily may be measured in money."'0 Special damages, including out-of-pocket expenses and medical expenses,can normally be quantified by reference to the before-and-after condition of the plaintiff. Such a before-and-after comparison ts not inheren t 1 y or logical 1 y requ i red, however , and only reflects a convenient measure for comparison. Other categories of damages d o not allow for such precision in calculation based on beforeand-after reference points. Nonpecuniary damages, such as pain and suffering,] ' are not compensatory in the sense that they represent compensation for a loss measurable in money. "The real purpose in such cases," writes Dobbs, "is to establish and vindicate a right that is deemed imporGeneral damages, not tied to quantifiable proof, serve to vindicate the substantive right that the law seeks to protect, serving as "the ultimate ex- Even if the logical dilemma can be surmounted, the Turpin, court then argued that assessing general damages rationally "in any fair, non-speculative manner" would be "impossible" and "outside the realm of human competence."This concern was apparent in Turpin I , in Speck, and In many other cases considering "diminished life" suits. O n this reading, the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, is simply incapable of comparing life to nonlife for practical reasons.
Yet, this position is inconsistent with comparisons which juries make all the time in a variety of cases: in wrongful death cases, a previous condition of life, which may be impaired to a lesser or greater extent, is compared to nonexistence; in personal injury cases, an impaired state after an accident is compared to a normal, or in some cases, less impaired state before the accident. This concern pervades the cases: by authorizing an action by the child, the courts will be adopting a life-negating stance. They will be making, indirectly, a negative "social worth eval~ation."'~ The courts are struggling to affirm eroding values, reflecting society's debate over abortion, and trying to avoid the appearance of makinga judgment, as a representativeof the State, of individual merit. They do not want to appear to decide against an individual life.l0
The "right" at stake in the "diminished life" suit is not a right not to be born, since one logical corollary is that the child or its parents is not seeking its death. Rather, the right is to be part of a family unit in which fully informed decisions as to reproduction have been made.l' The wrong clearly illustrates this, since the breach of duty in these cases is the failure of the physician or laboratory to provide full, accurate information to the parents about their genetic legacy, leading to an incompletely informed decision. The child's right is illuminated by the remedies-compensation for pain and suffering, the child's special expenses bcyond the age of majority, and Before us, unfortunately, is a livingand breathing, but incurably diseased, deformed and suffering human being who never had a chance to be born healthy and who will be in need ofextraordinary medical and other special care for the rest of her days. Any argument that this life of suffering is not the natural and probable consequence of appellees' misconduct is rank sophist~y.~' An award of damages to a person born with defects entails a judgment only that the person's predicament imposes psychological and financial burdens o n the child, the parents, and siblings, that ought in fairness to be borne by someoneel~e,~' when that other person, whose expertise was relied upon by parents in makinga reproductive decision, failed through his negligence to deliver correct information. The judicial difficulties stem in part from the semantic trap that a finding for a plaintiff is a judicial statement that his life is "wrongful." Only a recharacterization of the tort can free the courts to look more broadly at the rights involved. Whether we call the tort "genetic malpra~tice,"~' "diminished life," or just plain malpractice, it would be a first step away from an unnecessarily rigid position.
an impaired child to sue its parents when they failed to get proper medical advice or to control their life style, and injury to the infant occurs This troubling possibility was promptly repudiated by the California legislature.17 However, such parent-child suits do not flow inevitably from allowance 0f"diminished life" suits, but must themselves be specifically allowed by the courts. Given the problems which parent-child suits might create, they could be barred either judicially or legislatively, or allowed only in exceptional cases when the parents acted with malice and intent to cause harm.18 Such cases would not involve the usual "diminished life" situation.
A second concern is that "diminished life" suits could be considered to assert a right to normalcy. This claim could justify state intervention in the form of a bureaucratic system of controls over reproduction to ensure an infant's health.19 Some commentators Recognition of a child's right to sue, separate from the parent's right, does not connote a judicial acknowledgement that the child's life is "wrongful," in the sense that death should follow. The cause of action is simply recognition of a harm, linked to a medical failure, which deserves compensation.
Pandora's Box: Keeping t h e Lid On
In recent cases such as Turpin and Speck, the judicial concern rhat recognition of this tort constitutes a lifenegating stance is accompanied by fears of opening up a Pandora's box of parent-child suits--"enormous new areas ofclaims, the true nature and extent of which cannot be predi~ted."~' The court in Curlen& had indirectly created the problem; it suggested in dicta that, where parents made a conscious decision to proceed with a pregnancy, after they had been fully warned, it saw "no sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering, and misery which they have wrought upon their offspring."'6 This statement suggests a right on behalf of urge a vigorous use of genetic knowledge to screen out genetically unfit through legal action that "fetuses destined to be born alive are not handicapped mentally and physically by the negligent acts or omissions of others."61 It is unlikely, however, that any impetus toward governmental controls over reproduction for the sake of infant health will derive from judicial recognition of diminished life claims.
A shift in social attitudes is likely to precede such a change in regulation of the parent-child relationship. "Diminished life" suits d o not require or compel such a value shift, since the nature of the claim is not normalcy, but rather compensation for the expenses and suffering of an impaired status. dora's box by carefully 1imiting"dior at least to ensure Courts can keep the lid on this Panminished life" suits to block claims by the child against his parents. Legislatively imposed genetic screening is unlikely to be triggered by "diminished life" suits, but rather will result only if social values shift far more dramatically than present evidence suggests that they will. Wrongful birth suits, now allowed by most jurisdictions which have considered the question, entitle the parents of impaired children to sue for their medical expenses, special costs in rearing the child, and pain and suffering and emotional di~tress.~) A "diminished 1ife"claim adds several additional elements of recovery. First, the pain and suffering of the child during its expected life span is a claim separate from that of its parents:' and could amount to a substantial claim if the child's life expectancy were not cut short by the genetic defect. Second, the child might have special expenses, includingcosts of maintenance, after his age of majority. Since the parents' claims for compensation will presumably terminate at that age, a child's claim will allow the support obligation to be continued by the negligent party.
Functions of Tort
As Judge Andreen argues in his dissentingopinion in Turpin,:
[I]f it is appropriate to award the parents special damages for the extra cost of living incurred because of a loss of hearing, why should not the child have a recovery measured by the same criteria for her life after she attains maj~rity!~'
The claim by the child therefore serves an important function by providing compensation for a range of expenses for which the parents are not entitled to recover.66 The court in Turpin, has thus gone halfway toward this position by allowing special damages to the child, above and beyond claims by the parents.
The deterrent function of tort suits results from the coupling of compensation with payment by the party who negligently caused the harm. A compensation system for injuries need not make such a linkage; indeed, a tax-supported fund from which victims collect, modelled on the New Zealand system, might more effectively serve the compensation function.67 The deterrent effect on the negligent tortfeasor would be lost, however, and it is the coupling of the two functions which distinguishes most aspects of the American tort system.68 Damage awards to plaintiffs are a "signal" to defendants such as doctors, informing them how much to invest in order to avoid future accidents.69 Effective deterrence may not be achieved, because distortions in the system, such as the impact of medical malpractice insurance,dissipate the burden of a damage award, but in theory and to some extent in practice, some incentives to change can be expected.'O Whether the suit is against the physician or the testing laboratory, allowing the child's claim separate from his parents' is essential to deterring suboptimal medical behavior. Facts like those presented in Turpin make the point most strongly. In Turpin, the plaintiff Joy was born with a hereditary total deafness abnormality. It may be in this case that the child's condition will not require substantial cost in continuing medical care, so that the parents can recover only for their pain and sufferingand other more limited special damages. The child's pain and suffering may, however, exceed by a substantial amount the parents' total potential recovery, over her lifetime, a possibility which the courts have failed to recognize. In this situation, the true costs of the injury to the family unit are significantly understated, and are finally borne in large part by the child and her family rather than by the negligent defendants." The defendant is not being forced to bear the full costs imposed by his negligent conduct, so that the deterrent effect of the damage award is reduced; therefore, too high a level of negligent conduct will result in the future. Underpricing the tort prevents the optimal level of care from being achieved.
central to suits involving genetic malpractice than to malpractice suits in general, for two reasons. First, the field of genetic counseling is new; litigation focussed on standards of practice will help the field to coalesce around acceptable norms of pra~tice.~' The pressure of litigation may spur practitioners to reduce the uncertainties by agreeingon norms of practice. Such a consensus will reduce the hazards of losing a lawsuit and the financial pressures of increased malpractice rates from proliferating litigation. Second, the source of the data which the physician or counselor must interpret and translate for the parents comes from prenatal diagnostic laboratories. Currently the laboratories performing prenatal diagnosis are underregulated, and operate under widely varying standards.') Control has come from the affiliation of these laboratories with university medical centers, where peer scrutiny and other constraints are present. Commercial laboratories are now proliferating, however, and their lack of affiliation and regulation may pose problems of unacceptable error rate^.^' A concern that profit may dominate quality control has also been e~pressed.~' Tort suits involvingsuch laboratories focus attention o n their central role in diagnosing genetic disorders, possibly spurring state regulation. The financial burdens of losing a tort suit (or settling it) create incentives for the commercial laboratories to reduce their error rates. The economic effects of malpractice judgments on enterprises are likely to be greater than that on individual physicians, for reasons related to the expected economic rationality of the corporate enterprise in internalizing its costs of operations and performing cost-benefit The deterrent function may be more calculations.
The articulation and validation of norms is a third function of tort suits.
The nature of the norm involved in the "diminished life" cases has created the dilemma in which the courts now find themselves; if the norm is simply a right not to be born, we find it unpalatable. Likewise,a claim to be born normal seems to lead onto the slippery slope toward parent-child suits for acts which parents failed to take prior to conception or birth. Neither normalcy nor a right to nonexistence is the central value in these suits, however. The norm at issue can be viewed as primarily informational, deriving from accepted principles of personal autonomy, as reflected for example in informed consent doctrine. The parents, on this theory, when they seek genetic counselingor medical intervention to terminate a pregnancy where they know it is likely that they will have an impaired child, have a right to the communication by a physician of accurate information about the occurrence and risk of reoccurrence of genetic disorders within a
The purpose of the information, or the preventive or termination procedure (sterilization, abortion), is toenable the parents to obtain and act upon accurate information in deciding whether to give birth to an impaired child. This norm clearly underpins the "wrongful birth'lcases. What the "diminished life" action adds to this norm is the additional claim that the child has a right to be "equipped to meet life on some sort of an equal basis,"" by means of compensation for his suffering and necessary medical support. Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, the claim can be viewed as a family right, in which the child alone suffers from the "impaired parental capacity of the parents caused by physiciandereli~tion."'~ In this analysis, thechild's existence is diminished not only because of his inherent impairments and suffering, but also because ofthe incapacity induced in the parents by the child's impairments.
The right at stake in these cases needs to be better articulated, as part of the essential process of setting the boundaries of medical practice in an emerging field like genetic counseling. Courts are professional line-drawers and spinnersofdistinctions, and in these cases as in others, hypothetical horrors need not follow inevitably from judicial allowance of such suits.
Finally, courts need to take a careful look at the functions which litigation serves. While it is currently fashionable to describe our society as "litigious," we must still be careful to sort out the values of a tort system, even as we expose the drawbacks. gram be provided economically-may provide a basis for extending cost reimbursement to independent emergicenters in the future.
Conclusion
The development and operation of emergicenters may increase competition in the health care sector. As demonstrated above, however, there is a need for uniform standards applicable to emergicenters in such areas as promotion, facility capacity, equipment and staffing, as well as integration of the emergicenter with the local emer-, gency medical system. Developing standards in these areas may be advantageous to independent emergicenters to the extent that they allow more complete reimbursement by third party payors. Moreover, both hospitalsponsored and independent emergicenters should at least be subject to certain common regulatory requirements, thereby providing a more equitable basis for competition between the two basic models. However, in the process of developing standards, governmental agencies and professional organizations must be cognizant of the varied structures that currently exist. In doing so, the substantial primary care functions of emergicenters cannot be overlooked; careful consideration of this aspect of emergicenters will result in a reasonable degree of struc-1 14 Lau. Medicined HralthCare tural diversity. In this way, the competitive element which emergicenters can bring to the health care industry can be effectively balanced with the need for reasonable protection of the public.
